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JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS AND THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT: IS THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT ADEQUATELY PROTECTING AN
ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL?
Abstract A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a funda-
mental pillar of our criminal justice system. The Sixth Amendment guar-
antees a criminal defendant the right to a lawyer during any critical stage of
a criminal proceeding. There is perhaps no time when an accused party's
right to counsel becomes more important than during an interrogation. It
is clear that the government cannot deliberately elicit information from an
accused party in the absence of his or her lawyer. "Deliberate elicitation,"
however, becomes difficult to define or detect when the government em-
ploys indirect methods of interrogation; rather than overt questioning, to
obtain information from an accused party. One such indirect method, the
use of jailhouse informants, presents special constitutional problems
because of the unique dynamics that exist in a jail cell encounter between
an unsuspecting defendant and an undercover informant, Courts have
struggled to apply the Sixth Amendment's prohibition on the elicitation of
information in the absence of counsel to situations involving jailhouse
informants. The U.S. Supreme Court has directly considered the issue twice
and has reached conflicting results despite strong factual similarities. This
Note proposes a new standard for detecting right-to-counsel violations in
the jailhouse informant context, a two-tiered inquiry that attempts to
address the unique constitutional problems that the use of jailhouse
informants creates.
INTRODUCTION
The right to counsel for a criminal defendant is a fundamental
pillar of our system of justice.' The Sixth Amendment embodies this
concept by guaranteeing an accused party the right to the assistance
of counsel for his or her defense. 2 In the absence of this right to a
lawyer during key events in a criminal proceeding, a criminal defen-
dant might not know how, or even when, to assert. important constitu-
tional rights. 3 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth
1 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
I See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1942).
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Amendment to entitle an accused party to a lawyer during any critical
stage of a criminal proceeding. 4
There is perhaps no time when an accused's right to counsel be-
comes more important than during a government interrogation. 5 Al-
though it is clear that the government itself cannot deliberately elicit
information from an accused party in the absence of his or her lawyer,
"deliberate elicitation" becomes difficult to define or detect when the
government attempts to elicit information indirectly. 6
 In situations
where the government uses undercover informants, the accused party
does not know that he or she is effectively being interrogated by a
government agent, and is thus unaware of the need to invoke his or
her right to counsel.?
Of the various undercover techniques that the government uses
to obtain information from accused parties, the use of jailhouse in-
formants presents special constitutional problems. 5 Jailhouse infor-
mants—incarcerated individuals placed in proximity to an accused
party to obtain incriminating information—often develop close rela-
tionships with unsuspecting defendants who think they are merely
conversing with fellow cellmates. 9 Because of the unique dynamics
that exist in a cellmate encounter between a defendant and a
jailhouse informant, including a sense of shared plight and the day-to-
day pressures of incarceration, it can be difficult to discern when ex-
actly undercover interrogation has taken place in this context."'
Given all of this, courts have struggled mightily to apply the Sixth
Amendment's prohibition on the elicitation of information in the ab-
sence of counsel to situations involving jailhouse informants." The
U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with the issue on only two occasions,
and despite strong factual similarities, reached conflicting results in
4 See Massialt, 377 U.S.
  at 205; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959); Powell, 287
U.S. at 69; see also Spano, 360 U.S. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring).
5 See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206; Spano, 360 U.S. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring).
6 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 321.
7 See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
8 See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 457-59 (1986); United States v. Henry,
447 U.S. 264, 273-74 (1980).
g See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 439-40; Henry, 447 U.S. at 266-69; Jana Winograde, Jailhousc
Informants and the Need for Judicial Use Immunity in Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 78 CAL. L. REV,
755, 755-56 (1990).
16
 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 422-24 (3d Cir. 1994) (broadly defining
the right to counsel in the jailhouse informant context); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710
A.2d 1112, 1118-20 (Pa. 1998) (same); see also United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357-
60 (7th Cir. 1991) (giving a narrower reading to the right to counsel in the jailhouse in-
formant context).
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these decisions." In the earlier of the two cases, United States v. Henry,
the U.S. Supreme Court. announced broad Sixth Amendment protec-
tions for an accused party confronted by a jailhouse informant."
There, the Court held that even without specific evidence that an in-
formant took active steps to elicit information from a defendant, a
right-to-counsel violation could still occur if the government agents
had worked behind the scenes to create a situation in which state-
ments were likely to be made." In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, the more re-
cent of the two cases, however, the U.S. Supreme Court announced
that for a right-to-counsel violation to occur, a jailhouse informant
must himself or herself take active conversational steps, "beyond
merely listening," to elicit information from an accused." This stan-
dard makes determining when a jailhouse informant has violated a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights no easy task."
This Note proposes a new standard for detecting violations of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when an accused party is con-
fronted by an undercover jailhouse informant." Part I explores the
fundamental principles behind the Sixth Amendment as defined by
the U.S. Supreme Court." It examines the basic contours of the right
to counsel in its most important context: direct and indirect methods
of police interrogation." Part II focuses on a unique form of indirect
interrogation: the government's use of jailhouse informants to elicit
information from an accused party. 2° It discusses in detail the only two
cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has examined the right to
counsel as it applies to the use of jailhouse informants—Wilson and
Henry. 21 This Part also examines Maine v. Moulton, an important right-
12 Wilson, 477 U.S. at 439-40, 459; Henry, 447 U.S. at 266-69, 274-75.
15 447 U.S. at 274-75.
14 See id.
15 477 U.S. at 459; sec Bruce D. Lundstrom, Sixth Amendment—Right to Counsel: Limited
Postindictment Use offailhouse Informants is Permissible—Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616
(1986), 77,1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 743, 743-44 (1986).
16 See, e.g„ State v. Leopardi, 701 A.2d 952, 956 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (la-
menting the court's own "difficulty in reconciling" jailhouse informant cases); Richard T,
Sans, Constitutional Rights of the Accused—Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel—Admissibility of
Incriminating Statements Obtained by Passive Jailhouse Informants—Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S.
Ct. 2616, 54 TENN. L. Rr.v. 105, 125 n.223 (1986) (commenting that "'struggled' may be a
kind word" to use to describe courts' difficulties in defining the right to counsel in under-
cover situations); Louis D. Lappen, Note, A Reconciliation of Henry and Wilson: The Intersec-
tion of Constitutional Rights with Procedural Review, 1987 Dula L.J. 945, 953.
17 See infra notes 284-314 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 41-101 and accompanying text.
26 See is 	 notes 102-227 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 110-192 and accompanying text.
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to-counsel case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court only months be-
fore Wilson because it presents a surprisingly broader reading of the
Sixth Amendment than one would expect given its proximity to Wil-
son.22
 Part III examines scholarly critiques of the Wilson decision."
These critiques center around the contention that Wilson is a worri-
some narrowing of an accused's right to counsel in the jailhouse in-
formant setting, a right that according to Heniy enjoys a broader pro-
tection." Part IV proposes a new standard with which to protect an
accused's Sixth Amendment rights in the jailhouse informant con-
text.25
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the assistance of counsel for his defence."26 This right is fundamental
to the fair trial of an accused party, 27
 and the U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently given an expansive reading to the protections that it af-
fords.28 In defining the contours of the right to counsel, the Court has
reiterated a single theme—that an accused party is entitled to the as-
sistance of counsel at any stage in a criminal proceeding where it
would help him or her. 29
 Thus, the instant that. the State's interactions
with a suspect turn from being investigatory to accusatory, the adver-
sarial system has commenced, and an accused must be allowed access
to a lawyer."
The U.S. Supreme Court's first modern exposition of the right to
counsel came in 1932, in the seminal case of Powell v. Alabama. 3t This
case involved three defendants accused of rape who had been con-
22 See infra notes 193-227 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 228-272 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 228-272 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Lundstrom, supra note
15, at 748; James J. Toinkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against
Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine. 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. I, 78-81 (1988).
25 See infra notes 273-314 and accompanying text.
"U.S. CONS'''. amend. VI.
27 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,342-46 (1963) (holding that the right to coun-
sel is so fundamental a right that it is an integral part of due process, and thus the Sixth
Amendment guarantee applies to state criminal proceedings via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
28 Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 748.
29 See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,170 (1985); Massiah V. United States, 377
U.S. 201,205 (1964); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,69 (1932); Saas, supra note 16, at 109
n.48 (1986).
w See Escohedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,492 (1964).
91 287 U.S. 45,71 (1932); seeSaas, supra note 16, at 109.
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victed and sentenced to death without having been appointed counsel
during the short time between their arraignments and trials.52 The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed their convictions, finding that the de-
fendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated." The
Court stated that the right to counsel applies not only during a trial,
but to any situation in which an accused would need the advice of a
lawyer.34 In giving the right to counsel this broad interpretation, the
Court made an important, fundamental recognition—that an accused
"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him."" Because the period of time between an accused's
arraignment and trial is a "critical period" where "consultation, thor-
ough-going investigation and preparation[are] vitally important," the
right to counsel exists just as strongly before trial as it does during
Decisions after Powell broadened its basic holding in a number of
important ways. 37 In 1961, in Hamilton v. Alabama, the Court clarified
what constitutes a critical stage in a criminal proceeding, defining it as
any period during which "[w] hat happens there may affect the whole
trial."" In 1967, in United States v. Wade, the Court took the critical
stage concept a step further, saying that the definition applies when-
ever "counsel's absence ... might derogate from [an accused's] right
to a fair trial."33 Around that same time, in 1964 in Escobedo v. Illinois,
the Court held that the right to counsel could even attach before
official proceedings have commenced against an accused—so long as
it is clear that police have moved beyond general investigation of a
crime to a point where their purpose is to elicit a confession from a
suspected party. 4°
A. The Right to Counsel in the Context of Direct Police Interrogation.
There is perhaps no more "critical" pretrial stage in a criminal
proceeding than an interrogation." In an interrogation setting, the
government actively attempts to elicit incriminating statements from
32
 Powell, 287 U.S. at 49-50, 57.
33 Id. at 71-73.
34
 Id. at 57.
35 Id. at 69.
38 Id. at 57.
87 Saas, supra note 16, at 109 n.48.
38 368 U.S. 52. 54 (1961).
3° 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967); see Tarttkovicz, supra note 24, at 1311.53.
40 See 378 U.S. at 484-85, 492.
41 See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325-26 (1958) (Doug-
las, J., concurring).
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an accused party.42 It is crucial that a defendant have the advice of
counsel when the State's "undeviating intent" is to use its prosecuto-
rial power to obtain a confession." Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court's
protection of an accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is per-
haps at its apex when methods of police interrogation are involved."
An important pronouncement of the right to counsel in the con-
text of direct police interrogation came when the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Spano v. New York in 1959.45 There, in an important concur-
rence, one Justice stated emphatically, and two others agreed, that the
Sixth Amendment meant little if it did not mean that an accused
party is entitled to counsel during an interrogation." Spano involved
petitioner, Vincent Spano, who allegedly had shot and killed a profes-
sional boxer who had previously assaulted him at a local bar. 47 Spano
was indicted on first-degree murder charges, and three days later
turned himself in to authorities, accompanied by counsel." His attor-
ney instructed him not to answer any questions, and left him in the
custody of police officers." Authorities then began to question Spano,
and engaged him in a "persistent and continuous" all-night in Ierroga-
don." During the initial stages of the interrogation, Spano refused to
answer any questions, and made multiple requests to speak to his at-
torney. 51 The police denied these requests, and by the early hours of
the morning, successfully elicited a confession from Spano. 52 At his
trial, the court admitted Spano's confession into evidence over his
objection, convicted him of first degree murder and sentenced him to
death."
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned Spano's conviction on Four-
teenth Amendment grounds, finding that the method in which
42 See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485; Welsh S. White, Mterrogation Without Questions: Rhode Is-
land v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L REV. 1209,1209-10 (1980).
See Spano, 360 U.S. at 324.
44 See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206; Spano, 360 U. S. at 324.
45 See 360 U.S. at 324-26.
46 Id. at 325-26 (Douglas, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 316.
" Id. at 316-17.
42 Id. at 317.
50 Spano, 360 U.S. at 317-20. Spano was questioned almost continuously from 7:15
p.m. until 4:05 a.m. Id.
" Id. at 317-18.
52 Id. at 319. At around 11:00 p.m., interrogators convinced a friend of Spano, a cadet
in the police academy at the time, to use deceptive tactics to convince Spano that =king a
confession was in his best interest. See id. at 317-19. He eventually succumbed to these
requests and confessed at approximately 3:30 a.m. Id. at 319.
53 Id. at 320.
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officers extracted the confession violated traditional principles of due
process." A concurring opinion, however, examined the Sixth
Amendment implications of the case, elaborating on what it saw as a.
"flagrant' violation of Spano's right to counse1. 55 This concurrence,
written by Justice Douglas and joined by two other members of the
Court, reaffirmed a fundamental Sixth Amendment principle first
announced in Powell—that the assistance of counsel prior to trial was
just as necessary, if not more so, than it was in open court." Later in
his concurrence, Justice Douglas asked a rhetorical question that
highlighted the Sixth Amendment concerns to which unlawful police
interrogations give rise:
[What use is a defendant's right to effective counsel at every
stage of a criminal case if, while he is held awaiting trial, he
can be questioned in the absence of counsel until he con-
fesses? In that event the secret trial in the police precincts ef-
fectively supplants the public trial guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. 57
Thus, in Spano, an important concurrence made clear that the right
to counsel is entitled to special protection when an accused is sub-
jected to police interrogation,"
B. The Right to Counsel in the Context of Undercover Interrogation
For the purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, sur-
reptitious methods of interrogation can be the functional equivalent
of direct questioning.59 Whether through the use of an undercover
agent, a turncoat accomplice, or a jailhouse informant, the govern-
ment often attempts to obtain through indirect means what it likely
could not get through direct interrogation." Indeed, police and
other authorities realize that subtle, deceptive tactics for obtaining
information from an accused can be far more effective than overt,
54 Id. at 324.
55
 Sparta, 360 U.S. at 325 (Douglas, J., concurring).
56 Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
57 Id. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring).
58 Id. at 325-26 (Douglas, J., concurring).
59 See 141assiall, 377 U.S. at 206; White, supra note 42, at 1210. Although various
definitions exist for what exactly constitutes "surreptitious" or "undercover" interrogation,
for the purposes of this Note the term is meant to connote any type of police attempt to
elicit incriminating statements from an accused party in which the accused is unaware that
he is talking to a government agent. See Saas, supra note 16, at 108 n.32.
6° See Spano, 360 U.S. at 321; White, supra note 42, at 1210-11.
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"browbeating" techniques such as direct questioning.° When an ac-
cused party is unknowingly confronted by an undercover police in-
formant, he is surely in as much of a critical stage of his pretrial pro-
ceedings as lie is during an open interrogation. 62
 This is because, un-
like a situation involving the direct questioning of a suspect by
authorities, when undercover means are used, the suspect is unaware
of a need to invoke his or her right to counsel. 63 Recognizing that
methods used to extract confessions are constantly becoming more
sophisticated, the Court has made it clear that the Sixth Amend-
ment's protections apply just as strongly to undercover interrogations
as they do to direct police questioning."
1. Massiah v. United States: The U.S. Supreme Court Creates the
"Deliberate Elicitation" Standard
In 1964, in the seminal case of Massiah u United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court first examined the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of undercover, surreptitious police practices. 66 The
Massiah Court held that the government violated a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right when it "used against him at his trial evidence of
his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately
elicited from him after lie had been indicted and in the absence of his
counsel."66 In so holding, the Massiah Court created a two-pronged
test for detecting right to counsel violations in interrogation set-
tings.° A defendant must show (1) that the person to whom he or she
spoke was a government agent, and (2) that the agent "deliberately
elicited" incriminating information from him or her in the absence of
counselP Massiah's test has provided the standard by which the Court
has evaluated Sixth Amendment surreptitious interrogation claims
ever since . 69
Massiah involved a merchant seaman, Winston Massiah, who had
been accused of federal narcotics offenses." Massiah and a codefen-
61 See White, supra note 42, at 1211.
62 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
63 See Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 79-81.
61 See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206; span°, 360 U.S. at 321.
66 377 U.S. at 206; sec Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 749.
66 377 U.S. at'206.
67 Id.
55 See id.; Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 13-14, 17.
69 See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 936, 957, 459 (1986); Moulton, 474 U.S. at 172-73;
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980); Brrwer, 430 U.S. at 401; Lundstrona, supra
note 15, at 749-50.
7°
 377 U.S. at 201-02.
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dant, Jesse Colson, were released on bail following their arraign-
ment. 71 After their release, Colson decided to cooperate with gov-
ernment agents in their investigation of ongoing narcotics activities in
which Massiah was allegedly involved. 72 Colson and a federal agent
installed a radio transmitter in Colson's automobile with which the
agent could monitor any conversation that took place in the car."
Shortly thereafter, Colson and Massiah had a long conversation while
sitting in the automobile, during which Massiah made a number of
incriminating statements related to his narcotics charges. 74 At trial,
these statements were used against him through the testimony of the
agent who had monitored them, and Massiah was convicted of multi-
ple narcotics offenses. 75
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Massiah's conviction on Sixth
Amendment grounds." Stressing that the right to counsel applies
equally to both overt and covert government interrogations, the
Court found that Massiah's Sixth Amendment rights had been vio-
lated by the government's actions." The police's illicit tactics led Mas-
siah to make incriminating statements that he almost certainly would
not have made had he known Colson was acting on the government's
behalf." The Court found that this tactic constituted deliberate elici-
tation of statements from Massiah, in violation of his right to coun-
se1. 79
The Messiah Court recognized that the government's use of un-
dercover agents can be the functional equivalent of direct interroga-
tion.80 The Court further recognized that surreptitious interrogation
can be more of a threat to an accused's Sixth Amendment rights than
overt questioning. 81 Messiah's "deliberate elicitation" standard thus
protects the important.Sixth Amendment principle that an accused
party is entitled to counsel in any type of interrogation situation,
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 202-03.
74
 Id, at 203.
73
 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 203.
76 Id, at 205-07.
77 Id. at 206. "'LIN such a rule is to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and sur-
reptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.'" Id, (quoting United
States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 1962) (flays, J., dissenting), rend, 377 U.S. 201
(1964)).
78 April Lee Ammeter, Comment, Kuhlmann v. Wilson: ''Passive" and 'Active" Govern-
ment Informants—A Problematic Test, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1987).
78
 Massialt, 377 U.S. at 206.
83
 See id.
81 Id.
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whether or not such accused party is aware that he or she is being in-
terrogated. 82
2. Brewer y. Williams Deliberate Elicitation Includes Subtle Methods of
Interrogation
More than a decade after Massiah, the U.S. Supreme Court went
further in defining what constitutes deliberate elicitation in the con-
text of a Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel claim es In 1977, in Brewer
v. Williams, the Court found that a detective's use of subtle psycho-
logical tactics to elicit a statement from a mentally ill murder defen-
dant constituted deliberate elicitation, in violation of his right to
counse1.84
Li Brewer; an individual named Robert Williams had been ar-
raigned for the murder of a ten year-old girl who had vanished out-
side of a Des Moines, Iowa, YMCA. 85 Williams, who had recently es-
caped from a mental hospital, had abandoned his car about 160 miles
outside of Des Moines and turned himself in at a police station
nearby.86
 Subsequently, two police detectives drove Williams to Des
Moines.87 Before Williams embarked on the three-hour drive, his at-
torney told him that the detectives were simply transporting him, and
that he should not speak with them at all about the crime until arriv-
ing.88
 During the car trip, however, a detective began to converse with
Williams in an attempt to elicit information. 89 Because the detective
knew that Williams was a former mental patient, and also that he was
deeply religious, he suggested that they should find the girl's body to
give her a proper Christian buria1. 90
 In response, Williams directed
82 See id. The Alassiall dissent saw the issue in a completely different light. Joined by
two other members of the Court, Justice White expressed concerns that the majority opin-
ion had created a rule which would bar the use of important evidence in criminal cases. See
id. at 208 (White, J., dissenting). In justice White's view, the case simply involved a defen-
dant who, at his own risk, chose to speak to a friend about a crime, who later decided to
disclose what he had heard. Id. at 208,211-12 (Whited, dissenting).
83 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 399-400.
84 Id. at 399.
85 Id. at 390.
e6 Id. at 390-91.
87 Id.
88
 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 391.
89 Id. at 392-93.
9° Id. at 392-93,399. The detective said:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the
road.... They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel
that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is
.... And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des
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the police to the body. 91 At Williams's trial, the court admitted evi-
dence of these statements over defense objections, and convicted Wil-
liams of murder. 82
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals's reversal
of Williams's conviction, finding that the detective's "Christian burial
speech" constituted deliberate elicitation of information from Wil-
liams, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counse1. 93 The
Court began its analysis by restating the broad contours of the right to
counsel—that it applies in any type of proceeding, "'whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or ar-
raigiunent.'"94 Finding that Williams's post-arraignment car ride with
two Des Moines detectives clearly met the standard for a critical stage
of the proceedings against him, the Court went on to inquire whether
the detective had deliberately elicited information from him. 95
The Court's finding of deliberate elicitation in Brewer rested on
an important premise—that the detective's use of subtle pressures to
obtain information from Williams was the functional equivalent of an
interrogation.96 As the Court itself put it, whether or not the interro-
gation took place through surreptitious means or otherwise was "con-
stitutionally irrelevant."97 The detective's "Christian burial speech"
was, in the eyes of the Court, "tantamount to interrogation" and thus
violated Williams's Sixth Amendment rights because it was conducted
in the absence of his attorney.98 indeed, the subtle tactics used by the
detective to obtain a confession from Williams were as effective—if
not more effective—than open, direct questioning. 99
Thus, in cases such as Spano, Massiah, and Brewer, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has outlined broad contours for the applicability of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.m An accused party is entitled to
the advice of counsel whenever the government attempts to obtain
Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this
little girl should be en tided to a Christian burial for the little girl ....
Id. at 392-93.
91 Id. at 393.
92 Id. at 394.
93 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 400-01.
" Id. at 398 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 906 U.S. 682,689 (1972)).
93 Id. at 399.
" Id. at 400.
97 Id. at 400.
99 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 400-01.
" See id. at 399-901.
I" See id.; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206; Spano, 360 U.S. at 325-26 (Douglas, J., concurring);
supra notes 45-99 and accompanying text.
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information from him or her, whether through open interrogation or
through subtle, undercover techniques.m
IL JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS—THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE
CONTEXT OF JAIL CELL ENCOUNTERS
In addition to the surreptitious, indirect interrogation tactics de-
scribed above, the government's use of jailhouse informants to elicit
incriminating information raises serious Sixth Amendment con-
cerns. 102 In a typical jailhouse informant situation, an incarcerated
individual who has agreed to act as a government informant is placed
in close proximity to the target of a government investigation—most
likely an accused party awaiting trial." A typical jailhouse informant
is told not to actively engage the accused in conversation about a
crime, but to be alert for any statements made by the accused.'"
Jailhouse informants are often rewarded for any information that they
provide, either in the form of monetary compensation or sentence
reduction."
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has been relatively consistent
in defining the Massiah v. United States deliberate elicitation standard
as it applies to other forms of indirect interrogation," the right to
counsel becomes harder to circumscribe in the context of govern-
ment use of jailhouse informants.'" This is because there are factors
present in a jail cell interaction not present in other types of infor-
mant-accused encounters." These factors include a strong desire for
camaraderie with fellow inmates, a sense of common plight, and the
day-to-clay pressures of incarceration, factors that make it difficult to
discern when, exactly, deliberate elicitation of information has oc-
curred." Two U.S. Supreme Court cases, United States v. Henry and
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, have attempted to define the contours of the
right to counsel as it exists in the unique context of a jailhouse infor-
101 See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 400-01; Messiah, 377 U.S. at 206; Spano, 360 U.S. at 325-26
(Douglas, J., concurring).
1 °2 See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,458-59 (1986); United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264,273-75 (1980).
108
	 Wilson, 477 U.S. at 439-40; Henry, 447 U.S. at 266; Robert M. Bloom, jailhouse M-
forrnants, CR04. jus•r., Spring 2003, at 20, 20-21; Winograde, supra note 9, at 755-56.
I" See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 439-40; Henry, 447 U.S. at 266.
10 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 266; Winograde, supra note 9, at 755-56.
1 " See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,202 (1964) (turncoat accomplice);
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,323 (1959) (deception by friend).
1 °7 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 456-59; Henry, 447 U.S. at 274-75.
laa See Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
1" Sec id.
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mant encounter."° Maine v. Moulton, a case decided between Henry
and Wilson, completes the trio of cases that comprise the modern
Court's exposition of the right to counsel as it applies to undercover
informants,'" Although Moulton does not deal specifically with the
use of a jailhouse informant, it contains important pronouncements
about the deliberate elicitation standard, and is illuminating because
it was decided in the same term as Witson. 1 l 2
A. United States v. Henry: The Court Provides Broad Protections Against
the Use ofJailhouse Informants
In 1980, in Henry, the U.S. Supreme Court applied Massiah's de-
liberate elicitation standard to the jailhouse informant context for the
first time, and in doing so announced broad Sixth Amendment pro-
tections for an accused party.'" In that case, the defendant, Billy Gale
Henry, was indicted for a bank robbery and incarcerated in a city jail
in Norfolk, Virginia)" Shortly after Henry was incarcerated, govern-
ment agents contacted Edward Nichols, another inmate being held at
that jail." 8 Nichols, who had on prior occasions acted as a paid infor-
mant for the government, told agents that he was housed in the same
cellblock as Henry." 6 An agent told Nichols to pay attention to any
statements he overheard from Henry or the other federal prisoners in
his cellblock, but not to question or initiate any conversation with
Henry about the bank robbery." 7 After this meeting, Henry and
Nichols had a conversation in which Henry told Nichols about the
bank robbery. 118 It is unclear from the facts of the case exactly what
transpired in the conversations between Henry and Nichols." 8 Henry
shared a number of details about the crime with Nichols, including a
description of evidence connecting him to the robbery. 120 Henry also
118 Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; Henry, 447 U.S. at 274-75.
111 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,176-77 (1985); Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 20.
112 See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176.
115 Henry, 447 U.S. at 270,274-75.
" 4 Id. at 265-66.
115 Id. at 266.
"6 /d.
117 Id. The agent later submitted an affidavit in which he stated "I specifically recall
telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry .... I recall telling Nichols not to initiate
any conversations with Henry regarding the bank robbery charges." Id. at 268.
118 Henry, 447 U.S. at 266.
118 See id. at 266-67.
129 Id.
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tried to enlist Nichols's help in a number of ways, including asking
Nichols to contact people for him after his release. 121
After his release from jail, agents contacted Nichols, who then
shared the information he had obtained from Henr Y. 122 The agents
paid Nichols for providing the information. 128 A few months later,
Nichols testified at Henry's trial as to the incriminating statements
Henry had made. 124 The jury, which was not told that Nichols was a
paid government informant, convicted Henry of bank robbery. 128
Henry was sentenced to prison for twenty-five years. 128 Upon learning
that Nichols was an informant, Henry sought habeas relief to vacate
his sentence, alleging that the admission of Nichols's testimony vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 127
 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied his motion, but
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 128 In so holding, the
Fourth Circuit stated that by developing a relationship of confidence
with Henry, to the point where Henry felt comfortable revealing in-
criminating information, Nichols and the government interfered with
his right to counsel. 128
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision.'" The Court held that Ibly
intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make in-
criminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Gov-
ernment violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to cotmsel." 131
Thus, the Court found that the government's use of Nichols as a
jailhouse informant to obtain statements from Henry constituted de-
liberate elicitation of information, as defined in Massiah. 132
In reaching its conclusion, the Healy Court put forth a number
of important considerations about the right to counsel as it relates to
the use of jailhouse informants.'" The Court confirmed Massiah's
121 Id. at 266 n.2. These requests indicate the level of trust that Henry had in Nichols
as a confidant. See id.
122
 Id. at 266.
123 Henry, 447 U.S. at 266.
124 Id. at 267.
123 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 267-68.
128
 Henry, 447 U.S. at 268-69; Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 1978),
affd, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
129 Henry, 447 U.S. at 269 (citing Henry, 590 F.2d at 547).
130 Id. at 275.
131 Id. at 279.
132 See id.; Messiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
133 See 447 U.S. at 274.
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holding that the Sixth Amendment applies just as strongly to indirect
and surreptitious methods of interrogation as it does to traditional,
overt methods of questioning. 134 Thus, the Court made clear that de-
liberate elicitation could just as easily take place in a jail cell conversa-
tion as it could during an all-night police interrogation. 135
The Henry decision went far in defining what exactly constitutes
deliberate elicitation in the unique jailhouse informant context. 136 In
examining Nichols's actions as a government agent, the Court dis-
cussed a number of important factors, including the fact that Nichols
was placed in close proximity to Henry, that Nichols was paid for in-
formation on a contingent fee basis, and that he had previously been
an informant. 137 These circumstances showed that the government
must have known that some sort of elicitation of information would
take place. 1 S 8 The Court further recognized that even when instruc-
dons were given to an informant. no/ to elicit incriminating informa-
tion from a target, a government agent should know that the infor-
mant might try to do so anyway in various subtle ways.' 39 In an impor-
tant observation, the Court noted that telling a jailhouse informant
not to initiate conversation with a particular inmate could actually
focus the informant. more on the inmate than if there had been no in-
struction at all." 9
The Henry decision also contained a number of candid recogni-
tions about the realities of jailhouse encounters that should play a
role in determining whether deliberate elicitation has occurred."'
The Court recognized that incarceration brings unique pressures into
play that might not exist. in other surreptitious interrogation situa-
tions—including powerful psychological inducements, a desire for
camaraderie, and a sense of common plight among inmates."2
 These
factors create "subtle influences" that make an accused party "particu-
larly susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents." 143
Conversations that take place in a jail cell have the tendency to yield
134 Id. at 273; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
133 Sec Henry, 447 U.S. at 273.
156 See id. at 270-75.
157
 Id. at 270.
158 Id. at 270-71.
1 " See id. at 271 n.8.
140
 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.8. This is because when a government agent mentions a
particular inmate's name to an informant, it becomes quite obvious at that point that the
government must have some interest in obtaining information from him or her. See id.
141 See id. at 273-75.
147
 Id. at 274.
145 Id.
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information that an accused would not otherwise share if lie knew he
was speaking to a government agent. 144 As the Fourth Circuit had
concluded in the case, even if Henry had been induced to give Nich-
ols information only through general conversation, it still was appar-
ent that a type of "interrogation" had occurred. 145 Thus, in affirming
the Fourth Circuit's holding, the Court seemed to indicate a willing-
ness to more readily find deliberate elicitation in the jailhouse infor-
mant context than in other types of undercover encounters with an
accused party.'"
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court noted
that Nichols had obviously managed to earn a great deal of trust from
Henry because Henry felt comfortable enough with him to discuss
details of the bank robbery. 147 It was this trust, the Court implied, that
enabled Nichols to obtain incriminating information from Henry,
even without evidence that lie resorted to using leading questions. 198
Because Nichols appeared to Henry to be a jailhouse acquaintance
sharing a "common plight," he could easily induce Henry to discuss
his past crimes. 149
The Henry Court thus broadly construed deliberate elicitation in
the jailhouse informant context.'" Even though it was not clear from
the facts of the case that Nichols affirmatively elicited specific remarks
from Henry, the Court still found deliberate elicitation.'" It did this
by looking at not only Nichols's actions, but also at the fact that the
government placed Nichols in the situation in the first place. 152 Be-
cause the government had to have known that doing so would result
in his obtaining information, the government itself had taken steps to
deliberately elicit statements from Henry.'" In the words of the
Court, this was not a case where the "'constable ... blundered,'
rather, it is one where the 'constable' planned an impermissible inter-
ference with the right to assistance of counsel."'" Thus, because the
government intentionally created a situation in which it was likely that
144 Henry, 447 U.S. at 273.
145
 See Henry, 590 F.2d at 547.
146 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-75.
147 Id. at 274 n.12. The Court stated that "Nichols had managed to become more than
a casual jailhouse acquaintance. That Henry could be induced to discuss his past crime is
hardly surprising ...." Id.
145 See id. at 273-74.
149 See id.
I5O See id.; Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1428-29.
191 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 266,273-75.
110 See id. at 274; Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1428-29.
155 Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
154 Id. at 274-75 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13,21 (1926)).
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Henry would make incriminating statements to a jailhouse informant,
the Court found that it had violated Henry's right to counse1. 155
B. Kuhlmann v. Wilson: The Court Narrows an. Accused's Protections
In 1986, six years after Henry, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited
the jailhouse informant issue in Wilson, and narrowed an accused
party's Sixth Amendment protections in that context. 156 In Henry, the
Court had reserved judgment on the question of the constitutionality
of the government's use of a jailhouse informant who acts in a com-
pletely passive fashion.I 57 In Wilson, the Court purported to deal with
that precise issue.'" In spite of strong factual similarities with Henry,
the Wilson Court decided that the jailhouse informant in Wilson had
made no effort to stimulate conversations about any crime. 159 The
Court found that such a situation does not violate an accused's right
to counsel, and in so doing seemed to retreat from the broader Sixth
Amendment. protections it had announced in Henry. 16°
In Wilson, the defendant, Joseph Allan Wilson, had been involved
in a taxicab garage robbery in which a murder had taken place. 161 Af-
ter turning himself into authorities while maintaining his innocence,
he was arraigned and incarcerated in a local jail.' 62 Prior to Wilson's
155 Id. In dissent, Justice Blackmun disputed the majority's conclusion that "subtle
influences" would make it likely that statements would be made in a jail cell setting. Id. at
284-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that there was just as much
pressure for a defendant not to speak, because it should be obvious to any detainee that a
jail is generally not filled with trustworthy characters. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting separately, was even more dismissive of the right-to-
counsel concerns in this case. See id. at 289-302 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist argued that there was no constitutional support for the idea that an attorney
must be present at any stage where an accused party might reveal information to someone
trying to elicit it. Id. at 295-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Echoing the speak-at-your-own-
risk approach to the right to counsel espoused by Justice White in Massiah, Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "[W]hen an accused voluntarily chooses to make an incriminatory re-
mark ... he knowingly assumes the risk that his confidant may be untrustworthy." Id. at
297-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 744.
157 447 U.S. at 271 n.9.
158 477 U.S. at 456.
159 Id. at 456, 460-61. It is important to note that in neither Henry nor Wilson was it
clear from the record what exactly had transpired between the defendants and informants.
See id. at 439-40; Henry, 447 U.S. at 266-67. Although the records in both cases described
the relationships between the parties in broad strokes, neither contains extensive discus-
sions of any actual conversations that had taken place between the defendants and infor-
mants. See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 439-40; Henry, 447 U.S. at 266-67.
160 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1440.
161 477 U.S. at 438-39.
162 Id. at 439. Coincidentally, Wilson's jail cell overlooked the scene of the crime. Id.
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arrival at the jail, a jailhouse informant named Benny Lee had agreed
with authorities to listen to Wilson and report any incriminating re-
marks that he made. 163
 A detective told Lee not to ask Wilson any
questions, but to "keep his ears open" for information)" Shortly
thereafter, Wilson discussed details of the crime with Lee, apparently
without having been asked to do so. 165 Initially, Wilson told Lee the
same version of the story that he had given police, claiming that he
had no involvement in the crime.' 66 After a few days, however, he
changed his story, and admitted to Lee that he had indeed been in-
volved in the robbery and murder. 167 Lee, who had been secretly
keeping notes of the details of his conversations with Wilson, provided
this information to a detective, and Lee subsequently testified against
Wilson at his tria1. 08 The trial court convicted Wilson of murder and
felonious possession of a weapon.' 69 After having his state appeals de-
nied, he filed for federal habeas relief based on the rule announced
in Henry)" Finding that the facts of Wilson's case were indistinguish-
able from those of Henry, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that his right to counsel had been violated, and granted him habeas
relief.' 71
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Sixth
Amendment did not block the admission of Wilson's statements to
Lee, because Lee had himself made no efforts to elicit information
from him) 72 Examining precedent such as Spano v. New -York, Massiah,
n's Id.
184 Id.
165 Id,
166
 Wilson, 477 U.S. at 440.
to Id. During this period of time, Wilson's brother visited Wilson in jail. Id. He told
Wilson that his family was upset because they believed that he had committed the murder.
Id. This may have had some effect on Wilson's decision to change his story and tell the
truth. Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 441.
17°
	 at 442-43.
171
 Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745, 748 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd and remanded sub
nom. Kuhlma nn v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). Examining Lee's relationship with Wilson,
the Court of Appeals concluded that:
[s1 ubtly and slowly, but surely, Lee's ongoing verbal intercourse with Wilson
served to exacerbate Wilson's already troubled state of mind .... The instant
case cannot be held to be equivalent to one where an informant merely sits
back and makes no effort to stimulate conversations with the suspect about
the crime charged .... Iu fact, we conclude that Henry is indistinguishable
from the present case.
Id. at 745 (citation omitted).
172
 Wilson, 477 U.S. at 456, 459.
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and Henry, the Court concluded that the primary concern of those
cases was the prevention of investigative techniques that were the
equivalent of interrogation.'" Because Lee had taken no affirmative
steps to engage Wilson in conversation about the crimes, his actions
were not the equivalent of interrogation, and thus did not offend the
principles of Massiah and its progeny. 174 The Court stated that a show-
ing that a jailhouse informant had reported incriminating statements
to the police, even if acting as a government agent, was not sufficient
to make out a Sixth Amendment violation. 175 Instead, the Court held
that "the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their in-
formant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed
deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks." 176
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued forcefully that the facts in Wil-
son were virtually indistinguishable from those in Henry, and therefore
that a Sixth Amendment violation had occurred."' Justice Brennan
pointed out three important similarities between the two cases: first,
in both cases the informants usually received compensation for in-
formation; second, both informants had been instructed not to ques-
tion the accused; and third, the informants had engaged in conversa-
tions with the accused that encouraged discussion of crimes.'" Con-
ceding that Lee's actions might not have been the immediate cause of
Wilson's admissions, Justice Brennan argued that this was of little im-
portance, because the Court instead should have focused on the
broader context of the encounters—just like it had in Henry."9 Criti-
cal of the narrow view of deliberate elicitation applied by the Wilson
majority, Justice Brennan contended that "the deliberate-elicitation
standard requires consideration of the entire course of government
behavior."180 Justice Brennan offered a somewhat different standard
for detecting deliberate elicitation in the jailhouse informant context:
looking to whether the government's action has a "sufficient nexus"
with an accused's admission of guilt's' For Justice Brennan, if the
176 Id. at 456-59; see. Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-75; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206; Spano, 360 U.S.
at 325-36 (Douglas, J., concurring).
174 Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 473-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 475-76 (Brea nanj., dissenting).
179 Wilson, 477 U.S. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the majority's view, Lee acted
primarily as a listener in Isis interactions with Wilson, and the immediate cause of Wilson's
admissions was his own unsolicited decision to make them. See id. at 460-61.
181 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181 Id. (Brennan,l, dissenting).
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steps that the government took with an informant could be causally
linked to an accused's statements, then the government was as guilty
as the informant of a Sixth Amendment infringement. 182 Therefore,
this nexus would demonstrate the government's surreptitious viola-
tion of an accused's right to counsel. 183
The Wilson decision seemed to signal a retreat from the broader
reading of the right to counsel given to jailhouse informant encoun-
ters in Henry.' 84 On facts very similar to those in Henry, the Wilson.
court reached the opposite result, finding that the use of a jailhouse
informant did not offend Sixth Amendment principles. 185 Whereas in
Henry the Court looked at the activity of both the jailhouse informant
and the government actors that placed the informant, Wilson seemed
to focus only on the informant himself. 186 It was not clear from the
record in either case that the informants had actually used conversa-
tion to deliberately elicit information from the accused. 187 Thus, the
differing results in Henry and Wilson seem to be based not on any
significant factual differences between the two cases, but instead on a
difference in how the two Courts chose to approach the matter. 188
After Wilson, criminal defendants will have to meet a high
threshold to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation inside of a jail
cell. 189
 The government's intentional creation of a situation in which
information is likely to be elicited does not seem, on its own, to vio-
late an accused's right to counse1. 1" In addition to government ac-
tion, the informant must himself or herself take active steps to elicit
information from the accused.' 9 ' In other words, "both 'active infor-
mant elicitation' and 'knowing state exploitation' are requisites for
the critical Massiah stage."' 92
182 See id. (Brennan,]., dissenting).
199 See Wilson, 977 U.S. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184 See Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1440; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 793-44,
188 Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; see Lappen, supra note 16, at 946.
183 See Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1434.
197 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 939-40; Henry, 947 U.S. at 266-69; White, supra note 92, at
1219.
186
 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; Henry, 947 U.S. at 479-75; Lappen, supra note 16, at
953-54.
189 See Wilson, 977 U.S. at 459; Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 20.
19° See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 20.
191 Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 20.
192
 Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 20 (emphasis added).
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C. Maine v. Moulton: The Case That Wilson Forgot
In 1985, only six months before Wilson., the U.S. Supreme Court
made some of its strongest pronouncements in two decades about the
breadth of the right to counsel in Moulton.'" Although Moulton did
not deal specifically with the use of a jailhouse informant, it contains
illuminating language about the contours of deliberate elicitation
when the government uses undercover informants.'" In Moulton, the
Court read the Sixth Amendment not only as providing protections to
accused parties, but also as creating an affirmative duty on the part of
police and prosecutors to avoid taking steps to infringe upon that
right. 195 Because it was decided so close to Wilson, the fact that Moul-
ton gives such a robust reading to the right to counsel warrants ex-
amination. 196
Moulton involved two defendants, Perley Moulton and Gary Col-
son, who were indicted on charges of burglary and theft, and were
released on bail pending tria1. 197 Shortly thereafter, Colson confessed
to his part in the crimes to local police and was offered a deal by
which no further charges would be brought against him if he would
cooperate in the prosecution of Moulton.'" Colson agreed, and al-
lowed authorities to electronically monitor both his telephone calls
and face-to-face meetings with Moulton. 199 During one of these meet-
ings, Moulton made a number of incriminating statements to Colson,
thinking that lie was merely discussing trial strategy with his codefen-
dant. 200 During the conversation, Colson told Moulton he had a poor
memory about the crimes, and asked Moulton to remind him about
the details of the crimes. 2°' Moulton obliged. 202 In addition, Colson
"reminisced" about the various crimes they had committed, which
also caused Moulton to join in and make incriminating statements. 205
Moulton's statements were used against him at his trial, and the court
193 Sce 474 U.S. at 176-77.
194 Id. at 171-76.
ws Id. at 171.
196 See id.; Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 18-20.
197 474 U.S. at 162. Coincidentally, the informant in this case had the same surname as
the informant in Massiah. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03.
198 Moulton, 474 U.S. at 162-63.
199 Id. at 163-64.
2917 Id. at 164-65.
291 Id. at 166.
202 Id. Colson made remarks to Moulton such as "I want you to help me with some
dates. One date I ... just can't remember what night did we break into Lothrop Ford?"
Id. at 166 n.5.
203 Moulton, 474 U.S. at 166.
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convicted him of numerous counts of burglary and theft. 204
 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine concluded that the
method authorities used to acquire information from Moulton vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and remanded the case
for a new tria1. 206
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine's decision, holding that Maine authorities had actively circum-
vented Moulton's Sixth Amendment rights. 206 In an opinion written
by Justice Brennan, the Court concluded that the right to counsel
means much more than a simple prohibition on certain types of State
behavior. 207
 It also imposes an obligation on the government to avoid
acting in any fashion that circumvents an accused party's Sixth
Amendment protections in any way. 208 According to the Court, "at the
very least, the prosecutor and police have an affirmative obligation not
to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protec-
tion afforded by the right to counsel."209
 By setting this minimum
standard of acceptable investigatory behavior, the Moulton Court
seemed to make it the duty of every government agent to take steps to
avoid infringing on a suspect's right to counsel in any way. 210
The Moulton Court found that the police had not met that
affirmative obligation to avoid circumventing the right to counse1. 211
Examining the actions authorities took in using Colson to obtain in-
formation, the Court concluded that the government had interfered
with Moulton's right to have a lawyer act as a medium between him-
self and the State. 212
 Because the government had to have known that
Moulton would reveal information to Colson under the assumption
he was merely a codefendant, the government knowingly circum-
vented Moulton's ability to request the presence of counse1. 213
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that there are
circumstances in which engaging a suspect in a conversation—without
anything else—can have the same effect as an open interrogation. 2"
2°4 Id. at 166-67.
205 Id. at 167-68 (citing State v. Moulton, 481 A.2d 155 (Me. 1984), affd sub 110M.
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985)).
2°8 See id. at 180.
207 See id. at 176.
2°8 See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176.
20° Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
210 Sex id.
211 Id. at 176.
212 Id.
215
 See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176.
214 Id. at 176-77 n.13-14.
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According to the Court, because Moulton believed Colson to be a co-
defendant with the same interests at stake, he felt free to discuss the
crimes with him and make incriminating statements. 215 Had he known
Colson was acting as a government informant and wearing a wire, he
likely would not have done so. 216 Thus, the State knowingly circum-
vented Moulton's right to counsel by deliberately eliciting statements
from him in this indirect way. 217
The Moulton view of the Sixth Amendment's protections repre-
sents one of the Court's broadest readings to date of the deliberate-
elicitation standard. 218 Its analysis of deliberate elicitation is consistent
with Henry in recognition of what the government "must have known"
was going to happen during such an encounter.213 Like the Henry
Court, the Moulton Court examined the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the accused-agent encounter, by analyzing not only Col-
son's actions, but also the actions taken by the government in using
him as an informant. 220
Nevertheless, the Moulton Court. seemed to go a step further than
the Henry Court when it imputed to prosecutors an affirmative duty to
respect an accused's Sixth Amendment rights. 221 The Court phrased
the right to counsel not only as a "negative" (that an accused cannot
be denied counsel), but also as a "positive" (that the government has
a duty not to circumvent that right, even when not asserted) . 222 Thus,
in 1985, five years after Henry and a year before Wilson, the U.S. Su-
preme Court made some of the last quarter-century's strongest pro-
nouncements about the Sixth Amendment right. to counsel. 223 That
these pronouncements were made at nearly the same time as Wilson is
remarkable.224
The Court has not spoken on the subject of jailhouse informants
since Wilson, leaving it and Henry as controlling precedent on the mat-
ter.225 Taken together with Moulton, these three cases comprise the
212
 See id.
216 See id. at 177.
217 Id.
218 Sec 474 U.S. at 177; Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 18.
219 Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176 u.12 (citing Henry, 447 U.S. at 271).
22° Id. at 176-77.
221
 See id.
222
 Sec id. at 171,176.
223 See id.; Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 18.
2.24 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 436; Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176-77.
225 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; Henry, 447 U.S. at 274-75. As discussed previously, Wil-
son purported to decide a jailhouse informant question different than that of Henry, mean-
ing that Henry was in no way overturned by Wilson. See supra notes 156-160 and accompa-
nying text.
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modern legal standard by which courts assess right-to-counsel claims
involving jailhouse informants .220 Determining whether deliberate
elicitation has occurred using these cases has proven to be a difficult
task for courts. 227
III. THE STATE OF THE LAW AFTER UNITED STATES V. HENRY AND
KUIILMANN V. WILSON
As can be seen from the divergent rulings in Kuhlmann v. Wilson
and United States v. Henry, the use of jailhouse informants to obtain
information from incarcerated defendants presents difficult Sixth
Amendment problems. 228 Indeed, when the deliberate elicitation in-
quiry is grafted onto an encounter between a jailhouse informant and
an accused party, a number of subtle factors come into play that con-
found the equation. 229
 Given this, courts and scholars have debated
exactly what the contours of an accused's right to counsel are in the
nuanced context of a jailhouse informant encounter. 284 In this debate,
Wilson has been largely viewed as an unwarranted retreat from Henry
broader Sixth Amendment protections. 231
226 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180; Henry, 447 U.S. at 274-75;
Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 20.
227 Some courts have relied primarily upon Wilson in right-to-counsel cases involving
jailhouse informants. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir. 1999)
(declining to examine deliberate elicitation issue in the absence of any evidence that the
informant himself had engaged defendant in conversation); United States v. York, 933 F.2d
1343, 1359 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding no deliberate elicitation by an informant in a murder
case, in spite of informant having had conversations with the accused about the crime).
But see, e.g., United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that because
government agents were aware that the informant in the case had a "propensity to inform
on his cellmates," the mere act of placing him in the cell with the defendant could consti-
tute deliberate elicitation in violation of his right to counsel); Commonwealth v. Francis-
cus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1119 (Pa. 1998) (holding that in a jailhouse informant case, the
court's focus should be on whether the government met its "affirmative obligation" not to
circumvent an accused's right to counsel). For a taste of the difficulty courts are having in
reaching decisions on this difficult issue, see State v. Leopardi, 701 A.2d 952, 956 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), which reviews jailhouse informant case law and states that
"candor requires us to confess our difficulty in reconciling several of these decisions," in-
cluding Henry and Wilson.
223 See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 458-59 (1986); United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264, 273-75 (1980); see also supra notes 184-192 and accompanying text.
226 Henry, 447 U.S. at 274. As discussed, these factors include the unique pressures of
incarceration, the desire to form jail cell camaraderie, and the perception of a common
foe, the government. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
230 See generally Ammeter, supra note 78; Lundstrom, supra note 15; Sans, supra note 16;
Tomkovicz, supra note 24; Lappen, supra note 16.
231 See, e.g., Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1440; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 743-44;
Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 80-81.
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A. Kuhlmann v. Wilson Assessed
The Wilson decision has been criticized for unduly narrowing an
accused's right-to-counsel protections in jail cell situations. 232 In con-
trast to Henry's broader definition, the type of government/informant
behavior that will trigger a Sixth Amendment violation was cast in
narrower terms by the Wilson decision. 233 As the Wilson Court stated,
to make out a violation of the right to counsel, "the defendant must
demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action,
beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit in-
criminating remarks."234 Because this standard seems to shift the Sixth
Amendment inquiry from the totality of the circumstances, including
government action, to an inquiry into specific action by an informant,
scholars have contended that Wilson fails to protect an accused's Sixth
Amendment. rights in certain types of jailhouse informant encoun-
ters.235
One major criticism of Wilson centers on the argument that its
facts are largely indistinguishable from those of Henry, and therefore
it should have been decided in the same way. 238 Based on the conten-
tion that Henry was correctly decided, and constitutes valid precedent,
Wilson should have been similarly decided because the two cases
shared three major factual similarities. 2" First, both cases involved
paid government informants. 238 Second, both cases had government
agents taking affirmative steps to place the informants in close prox-
imity to the accused parties. 239 In addition, the informants in both
cases were instructed by agents not to initiate conversation with the
accused about their charges. 24° Third, and perhaps most importantly,
in both cases it seems that informants were able to develop some level
of close rapport with the accused—at least to the point where in-
criminating information was revealed. 241 In spite of these similarities,
Wilson did not adequately discuss or distinguish Henry's direct prece-
232 See, e.g., Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1440; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 743-49;
Tonakovicz, supra note 24, at 80-81.
2" See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 959-60; Henry, 497 U.S. at 279.
234 477 U.S. at 459.
235 See, e.g., Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1439; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 743-44;
Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 80.
236 See Lappen, supra note 16, at 946.
237 See id. at 951-52,962.
238 Id. at 951-52.
238 See id. at 952.
240 Id.
241 See Lappen, supra note 16, at 952.
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dent. 242 In fact, the Wilson Court devoted only three brief paragraphs
to an analysis of Henry, and after doing so, reached the opposite re-
sult. 243 In doing so, it has been argued that confusing, conflicting
precedent has been created with which courts will have to grapple. 244
Based on the premise that Henry and Wilson are factually indistin-
guishable, this line of criticism goes as far as to say that Wilson was de-
cided incorrec 4. 245
It has also been argued that Wilson's focus on the activity or pas-
sivity of a jailhouse informant is misguided. 246 Wilson's focus on the
actions of the informant himself, divorced from the context of the
government activity that placed him there, is an incomplete inquiry. 247
No jailhouse informant is truly "passive," because behind that infor-
mant is a government agent who has actively and deliberately placed
him near the accused in hopes of obtaining information from him. 248
Thus, weighing the "activity" or "passivity" of a jailhouse informant
misses the mark, and the Wilson Court's focus should have been on
the government action in placing the informant in the cell in the first
place instead.249 It is at that step that deliberate elicitation has oc-
curred. 25° Further, a "passive" undercover informant endangers an
accused's right to counsel just as much as an "active" one does, be-
cause in both situations the accused has no idea that he or she is
speaking to a government agent. 2"
A distinction between "passive" and "active" informants—even if
it were valid—would be practically impossible to define for three rea-
sons. 252 First, it is often diffiCult to examine the record of a case and
determine from it the character of an informant's actions towards an
accused.253 Evidence of this can be found in Wilson itself, where the
majority and dissent interpreted the same factual record in very dif-
ferent manners.254 Second, there exist serious evidentiary problems in
determining what took place inside of a jail cell 255 Often, the only
242 See, e.g., Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 764.
243 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 458-61; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 764.
244 See Lappen, supra note 16, at 953.
245 See Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 744, 763.
246 See, e.g., Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1437-38.
247 See id. at 1434.
248 See Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 79-80.
24° See Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1437-38.
25° See id.; Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 79-80.
251 See Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 80-81.
252 See Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1434.
253 Id. at 1435.
254 Id.; see 477 U.S. at 459-60, 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
255 Ammeter, mina note 78, at 1435-36.
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available evidence consists of the conflicting testimony of the infor-
mant and the accused as to what was said by whom. 256 Finally, it is
difficult to determine what informant action can properly be labeled
as an active attempt to elicit information. 257 Discerning this "trigger-
ing" event can be nearly impossible after the fact. 258
B. Calls For A Revival of United States v. Henry
The most compelling critique of Wilson is that it is an unwar-
ranted retreat from the Sixth Amendment protections announced by
the Court in prior decades. 255 From Massiah v. United States through
Maine v. Moulton, the Court had broadly defined when the govern-
ment violated the right to counsel, examining not only the actions of
undercover informants, but also the nature of the government's aid to
the informant. 260 Wilson's primary focus on the actions of the infor-
mant—and not the government action placing him there—was a
sharp deviation from larger principles announced in Massiah, Henry,
and Moulton, that there is an affirmative duty on the part of the gov-
ernment to respect an accused's Sixth Amendment rights. 261 Wilson
thus represents a sudden break in what has been a long chain of
broad, liberal readings of the Sixth Amendment's guarantees. 262
The Wilson standard allows the government to shirk that duty,
because it may create a situation where information is likely to be ob-
tained, but deliberate elicitation will not occur unless the informant
himself or herself takes active steps in conversation with the ac-
cused. 263 Contrary to the fundamental holding of Wilson, it is of no
constitutional import whether an informant is passively listening or
not. 264 By deceiving an accused party into thinking that he or she is
simply speaking to a fellow cellmate, the government has actively vio-
lated that defendant's right to counsel. 265
As noted by justice Burger in Henry, when the government know-
ingly and intentionally creates a situation in which it is likely that an
accused party will make incriminating statements without counsel
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1436.
236 Id.
239 See, e.g., id. at 1434; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 743-44; Tomkovicz, supra note 24,
at 83.
260 See Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1434.
261 see id.
262 See id. at 1440.
263 See 477 U.S. at 459; Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1437.
264 See Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1437.
265 See id. at 1437-38; Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 80-81.
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present, deliberate elicitation occurs 2 66 In light of the "powerful psy-
chological inducements" of incarceration—such as a desire on the
part of an accused party to form bonds with fellow inmates—deliber-
ate elicitation of incriminating statements happens much more read-
ily in a jail cell than it does in other situations. 267 Wilson failed to take
these factors into account when defining what constitutes deliberate
elicitation inside of a jail cell, and in doing so defined that term too
narrowly.268
Although Wilson has engendered some support—for example, on
the ground that it provides a workable, bright-line test with which to
detect jail cell right-to-counsel violations269—the overall scholarly re-
action to Wilson seems to be much more negative than positive. 270 In
cases where little or no evidence exists that an informant took active
conversational steps to induce an accused party to make incriminating
statements, Wilson. would prevent a successful right-to-counsel claim. 271
Wilson's requirement that the informant himself or herself do some-
thing beyond passive listening in order to trigger a right-to-counsel
violation narrows the number of successful Sixth Amendment claims
that can be made. 272
IV. A NEW STANDARD
A. Kuhlmann v. Wilson 's Shortcomings
The Sixth Amendment standard announced in Kuhlmann v. Wil-
son fails to detect a wide range of Sixth Amendment violations that
take place when the government uses a jailhouse informant to obtain
information from an accused party.273 By requiring an informant to
do something "beyond mere listening" in order to satisfy the re-
quirement of deliberate elicitation, the Wilson standard fails to recog-
nize that government prearrangement with an informant can be, by
itself, an act of elicitation.274 The government's act of placing an in-
formant in close proximity to an accused party—knowing that it is
266 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 274; Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 79-80.
267 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 767.
268
 See Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1436-38.
266 See Saas, supra note 16, at 126-27.
2" See, e.g., Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1437-38; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 773-74;
Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 79-81.
271 See 477 U.S. at 459.
272 See id.; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 769.
273 See 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986); Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 744.
274 See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980); Ammeter, supra note 78, at
1437.
2003]	 Jailhouse Informants and an Accused's Eight to Counsel 	 1351
more likely than not that the party will make statements to the infor-
mant—is a deliberate circumvention of an accused's right to counsel,
one that should be barred by the Sixth Amendment. 275
Wilson, however, requires that the government and informant
work in tandem to actively elicit information from an accused in or-
der to violate the right to counse1.276 This dual requirement simply
sets the bar too high.277 Even without active, conversational participa-
tion by an informant, a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the
government takes advantage of an accused party's ignorance and puts
him in the presence of an undercover agent.278 By failing to accord
weight to this important premise, Wilson represents an unsound and
unwarranted retreat from the right-to-counsel protections announced
in United States v. Henry. 279
The government has an affirmative obligation not to circumvent
an accused's right to counse1. 280 When the government knowingly ex-
ploits an opportunity to obtain information from an accused party in
the absence of counsel—which it surely does when it places an infor-
mant in a cell with the accused—it shirks this obligation. 281 Under
Wilson, however, the government may do precisely that, so long as it
instructs an informant merely to listen. 282 Thus, the Wilson standard
fails to hold the goVernment to its affirmative obligation to respect an
accused's right to counse1. 283
B. A New Standard
A better standard to detect Sixth Amendment violations would
apply a two-tiered inquir y.284 First, a court should inquire whether an
informant actively engaged the defendant so as to deliberately elicit
incriminating statements from him or her. 285 If an informant is found
to have done so at the behest of the government, a violation of the
right to counsel has clearly occurred. 286
 If an informant has been
275 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,176 (1985); Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 79-80.
276 477 U.S. at 459.
277 See supra notes 259-268 and accompanying text.
478 Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 80-81.
279 See supra notes 259-265 and accompanying text.
280 Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176; see supra notes 206-213 and accompanying text.
281 See id.; Tomkovicz, .supra note 24, at 80.
262 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459.
285 See id.; Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176; Tomkovicz, supra note 24, at 80; see also supra notes
259-265 and accompanying text.
264 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
286 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459.
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"passive," however, the inquiry should not end, and a second test
should be applied. 287 As the second tier of its inquiry, a court should
examine the entire course of the government's action in the case, and
determine whether the government created a situation in which it was
likely that incriminating statements would be made. 288 If a sufficient
nexus can be found between the State's action and any admissions
made by the accused, a violation of the right to counsel has occurred,
regardless of the informant's passivity. 289
This standard would combine the somewhat conflicting holdings
of Henry and Wilson into a single inquiry.29° It recognizes that in an
undercover jailhouse interrogation, there are really two parties work-
ing to obtain information—the informant, and the government agent
that placed the informant in proximity to the accused. 291 This stan-
dard would take Wilson's focus on the actions of the informant, and
Henry's focus on the actions of the government, combining them into
a broader, more effective standard for protecting an accused's Sixth
Amendment rights. 292 This standard would capture far more right-to-
counsel violations than the narrower Wilson test does, and in doing so
would restore the scope of Sixth Amendment protections to where
they were for the better part of a quarter-century prior to Wilson.293
The first tier of this two-tiered approach would incorporate Wil-
son's distinction between passive and active informants."' The Wilson
Court showed a valid concern about the legitimate use of passive in-
formants who overhear incriminating statements and voluntarily pass
that information on to authorities without any prompting before-
hand. 295
 Under this proposed standard, that behavior would satisfy the
first (and second) tier of the inquiry, consistent with the contours of
the Sixth Arriendment.29° Informants who take active conversational
287 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ammeter, supra note 78, at
1437-38.
288 See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176; Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74; see also supra notes 136-155
and accompanying text.
289 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 177-183
and accompanying text.
289 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
291 See Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1434-38.
292 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; Henry, 447 U.S. at 274.
293 See Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1440; see also supra notes 59-155 and accompanying
text.
294 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459.
299 Id.
296 Id.; see also supra notes 284-289 and accompanying text.
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steps to elicit incriminating remarks from accused parties, however,
would, and should, trigger a right-to-counsel violation. 297
This approach recognizes that even objectively passive jailhouse
informants cannot be fairly labeled as "merely listening. "298 They are
prisoners with a vested interest in obtaining information from unsus-
pecting cellmates. 299 They are undercover government agents with a
powerful interrogatory tool at their disposal—the unique pressures of
incarceration."° Thus, given the many subtle ways in which an infor-
mant can elicit information, whether or not lie or she says certain
magic words to cause an accused to speak should be of little import to
a valid Sixth Amendment inquiry."' An informant will rarely resort to
blatant, open questioning in order to elicit a confession, and instead
might use far more subtle methods to induce statements." 2 When the
government, fully aware of this fact, places an informant in a cell with
an accused, the Sixth Amendment violation has already occurred. 803
The second tier of this approach would examine the steps taken
by the government to create a situation in which information would
be obtained. 804 If a sufficient nexus exists between the government
action and the statements made, then the government action is akin
to surreptitious interrogation, and is thus violative of the right to
counsel.805 This inquiry recognizes that the placement of an infor-
mant in the proximity of an unsuspecting accused party is, effectively,
just as much an act of deliberate elicitation of information as direct
questioning.30
This second tier takes into account that there are unique pres-
sures of incarceration which make it far more likely that an accused
party will reveal information than in other settings. 807 The perception
that an informant is a fellow inmate sharing a common plight, cou-
pled with a desire for camaraderie in such a harsh setting, make an
accused party more susceptible to subtle tactics than in other situa-
297 See id.
298 See hi.; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 766-67.
299 See Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 766-67,
300 See Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 767.
291 See Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1437; see also supra notes 246-258 and accompanying
text.
892 Sec Henry, 447 U.S. at 272 n,8; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at 766-67.
202 See Tomkoria, supra note 24, at 79-80.
'" See Henry, 447 U.S. at 274; Ammeter, supra note 78, at 1438-39.
505 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ammeter, supra note 78, at
1438-39.
5°5 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Tomkovicz, supra note 24,
at 79.
so Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74.
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tions."8 The pressures of incarceration themselves can lead to the
elicitation of statements, even if an informant is "merely listening." 808
By actively placing an informant and an accused together in this type
of environment, the government engages in the functional equivalent
of interrogation.310 The second tier of this proposed inquiry recog-
nizes that basic fact, and would find a Sixth Amendment violation
whenever the government took steps to create a situation in which
incriminating statements were likely to be made in a jailhouse set-
ting.sti
The two-tiered inquiry proposed here would represent somewhat
of a revival of Henry, and in doing so would better prevent abuses of
an accused's right to counsel 912 The broader definition of a right-to-
counsel violation in the jailhouse informant setting fits far better with
the principles announced as far back as Massiah v. United States and
even Powell v. Alabama.'" By examining the totality of the circum-
stances, as was done in Henry—looking at both the actions of the
jailhouse informant and the government in any given jail cell encoun-
ter—this standard would capture far more Sixth Amendment viola-
tions than the Wilson standard currently does. 3"
CONCLUSION
Although the use of jailhouse informants to obtain information
from an accused party may be a highly effective law enforcement tool,
the tactic raises serious constitutional questions. Providing prisoners
with an incentive to obtain information from unsuspecting cellmates
does not look like the activity of a government concerned with the
Sixth Amendment rights of its citizens. The government has an
affirmative obligation to respect an accused's right to counsel, and the
use of a jailhouse informant "middle man" to elicit information from
a defendant comes dangerously close to an abandonment of that ob-
ligation. Courts should be as concerned—if not more so—with subtle
503 Id.
3°° See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74; Lundstrom, supra note 15, at
766-67.
313 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting); supra notes 263-268 and
accompanying text.
3" See Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-75; supra notes 263-268 and accompanying text.
312
 See id.; supra notes 284-293 and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 31-82 and accompanying text.
314 See Wilson, 477 U.S. at 459; id. at 475-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Henry, 474 U,S. at
274-75.
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tactics of deliberate elicitation as they are with more overt methods of
interrogation.
The standard set forth in Kuhlmann v. Wilson does not adequately
reflect that concern. The right to counsel is too important to hinge
on whether or not a jailhouse informant says certain magic words. As
the Court in United States v. Henry recognized, courts also need to look
at the actions government agents take in placing the informant there
in the first place. When the government takes deliberate steps to cre-
ate a situation in which it is likely that information will be elicited, it
is, in terms of the right to counsel, just as constitutionally offensive as
an all-night interrogation is. The standard proposed in this Note rec-
ognizes this broad reading of the Sixth Amendment, and would en-
sure that statements obtained in violation of its principles would not
be admitted in a court.
Although this standard would substantially limit the use of
jailhouse informants as a permissible method of undercover investiga-
tion, this should be viewed as a desirable goal. Especially in today's
legal and political climate, where legitimate concerns exist about the
curtailment of individual liberties in the face of increasing govern-
ment police power, courts need to be vigilant in their protection of
the rights of accused parties. The right to counsel is far too funda-
mental and important to be afforded anything less.
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